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In response to the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001 by al-Qaeda 
upon the United States, the U.S. Government has responded with a vast 
“War on Terror,” both domestically and abroad.  The U.S.’s pursuit of al-
Qaeda and other affiliated terrorists abroad has led to increased use of 
advanced technology, which in turn allows the U.S. to pursue terrorists and 
enemy combatants in far away countries where they have little or no troop 
presence.  These operations, occurring most often in the form of remote–
controlled drone strikes, have been the increasingly favored method of 
combating terrorists both in Afghanistan, where the U.S. is at war, as well 
as territories where Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives have fled, such as 
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Pakistan and Afghanistan.1  President Barack Obama allegedly even has a 
secret kill list of high–risk terrorists who have been pre-approved for killing 
if they are found by U.S. operatives.   
This increased use of allegedly pre-approved strikes has led to significant 
controversy.  This Article explores the claims of Nasser al-Aulaqi on behalf 
of his son, Anwar al-Aulaqi, who has allegedly been placed on the Obama 
Administation’s pre-approved terrorist kill list.  Part I of this Article 
introduces Anwar al-Aulaqi and his father’s proposed injunction to have 
him taken off the targeted kill list.  Part II of this Article lays out all of the 
current statutory and case law that the U.S. government currently acts under 
when pursuing and prosecuting terrorists.  Part III of this Article explores 
the applicability of this legal framework to al-Aulaqi’s case and the merits 
of the plaintiff’s case in light of the government’s motion to dismiss.  Part 
IV examines the D.C. Circuit’s grant of the government’s motion to 
dismiss.  Ultimately, this case raises fundamental issues regarding the Due 
Process owed to U.S. citizens engaged in acts of terrorism abroad, but the 
sensitive nature of national security and military concerns and prudential 
requirements will ultimately keep full adjudication of these issues awaiting 
their day in court.     
I. APPROVAL FOR EXECUTION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS?
A.  Who is Anwar al-Aulaqi? 
Who is Anwar al-Aulaqi, and why does President Obama want him 
dead?  In April, 2010, President Obama allegedly added al-Aulaqi to the list 
of terrorism suspects pre-approved for targeted killing.2  The Obama 
Administration has identified al-Aulaqi as a leader of al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and alleges that he has “recruited individuals to 
join AQAP, facilitated training at camps in Yemen in support of acts of 
terrorism, and helped to focus AQAP’s attention on attacking U.S. 
 1. For a full discussion of the U.S. military and C.I.A. use of increased drone strikes 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, see, e.g., for Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. 
Counterterrorism Strategy and Law  (Brookings Inst., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Hoover 
Inst., Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415070;Mary Ellen 
O’Connell.  Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009.
(Notre Dame Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144. 
 2. Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2010, at A12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/middleeast/07yemen.html.  Much information 
about al-Aulaqi is publicly known due to extensive reporting of the New York Times; none 
of the information in this Article was gleaned from any documents released by Wikileaks. 
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interests.”3  AQAP has been taken responsibility for several attacks on 
South Korean, Yemeni, Saudi Arabian and U.S. targets.4  Al-Aulaqi has 
been designated a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT) by the 
Obama Administration,5 as well as placed on the United Nations’ list of 
known associates of al-Qaeda.6  Specifically, al-Aulaqi is accused of 
training and aiding Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the attempted Detroit 
Christmas Day airline bomber,7 and has also been linked to Major Nidal 
Hasan, who is the accused killer of thirteen people at Fort Hood, Texas.8 Al-
Aulaqi is well known for his multitude of postings on YouTube; 
Abdulmutallab, Hasan, and several others suspected of crimes or attacks 
have cited al-Aulaqi’s YouTube postings as inspirations for their actions.9  
In March of 2011, a former British Airways employee was convicted of 
conspiring with al-Aulaqi to blow up a United States-bound airplane.10 
The fact that the Obama Administration has approved military action in 
the form of targeted killing of a terror suspect is not unique11 and is justified 
  
 3. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 5, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-01469) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss]. 
 4. Unclassified Declaration in Support of Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege 
by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence at 8, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No.10 cv 1469) [hereinafter Clapper Declaration].  
 5. Designation of Anwar Al Aulaqi Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and the 
Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233, 42334 
(July 23, 2010) [hereinafter Al-Aulaqi Executive Order]. 
 6. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban 
Sanctions Committee Adds Names of Four Individuals to Consolidated List, U.N. Press 
Release SC/9989 (July 20, 2010). 
 7. Robert F. Worth, Cleric in Yemen Admits Meeting Airliner Plot Suspect, 
Journalist Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at A7, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/world/middleeast/01yemen.html?ref=umar_farouk_abd
ulmutallab.  In an interview with a Yemeni journalist, al-Alaqui admitted that he 
communicated with Abdulmutallab and that he was a “student” of his.  Al-Alaqui denied 
having any knowledge about the attack before it occurred, but noted that he supported the 
attack and was proud of Abdulmutallab.  Id. 
 8. Muslim Clergyman Speaks, N.Y. TIMES  (Dec. 24, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/us/24hood-002.html?ref=nidal_malik_hasan. 
 9. John F. Burns & Miguel Helft, YouTube Withdraws Cleric's Video, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/world/05britain.html?ref=anwar_al_ 
awlaki.  Roshonara Choudhury, a British theology student who was convicted of attempted 
murder of British legislator Stephen Timms, stated that she was inspired to “punish” Timms 
for his Iraq War vote after watching hundreds of hours of al-Aulaqi’s videos online.  Id.  The 
videos have since been removed from YouTube.  Id. 
         10.    Britain: Former Airline Employee Gets 30 Years in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES., 
Mar. 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/europe/19briefs-ART-
Britain.html?ref=anwaralawlaki.   
   11. In September of 2010 alone, the C.I.A. launched 20 targeted drone attacks on 
militants in Pakistan accused of aiding the Taliban in Afghanistan.  See Mark Mazzetti & 
Eric Schmitt, C.I.A. Steps Up Drone Attacks on Taliban in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/asia/28drones.html.     
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under the Congressional Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF)12
and international legal principles of self–defense;13 al-Aulaqi’s case raises 
questions of both domestic and international law because he is a U.S. 
citizen.14  The approval of the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen is believed to 
be without precedent,15 although the classified nature of such designations 
makes this difficult to confirm.16
After President Obama allegedly placed al-Aulaqi on the designated kill 
list, his father, Nasser al-Aulaqi,17 retained the American Civil Liberties 
Union and Center for Constitutional Rights to “provide him with legal 
representation in connection with the government’s reported decision to add 
his son . . . to its list of suspected terrorists authorized to be killed.”18
Nasser al-Aulaqi sought to prevent the Obama Administration (specifically 
the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the C.I.A.) from 
killing Anwar al-Aulaqi without articulating a “concrete, specific, and 
imminent threat to life or physical safety” that he may pose; the proposed 
injunction also sought that, even if al-Aulaqi was found to pose such a 
threat, targeted killing be the last resort once it is determined that “there are 
no means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed.”19
The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the government’s policy of 
targeting U.S. Citizens abroad without articulating a specific crime or threat 
violated said citizens’ “Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizures and . . . [their] Fifth Amendment right not to be 
 12. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 13. U.N. Charter art.51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations.”).See also North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 
U.N.T.S. 243 (recognizing individual or collective right to self-defense). 
 14. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 5; Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted 
Killing of American Cleric, N.Y.TIMES, April 7, 2010, at A12.  Al-Alaqui was born in New 
Mexico.  Id. at A12. 
 15. Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2010, at A12 (“A former senior legal official in the administration of George W. 
Bush said he did not know of any American who was approved for targeted killing under the 
former president.”).
 16. Id.  Although the Los Angeles Times and New York Times were able to confirm 
that al-Aulaqi was placed on either the C.I.A. or D.O.D. “kill lists,” they were only able to do 
so through anonymous sources.   
 17. Nasser al-Aulaqi, a citizen of Yemen, brought his suit under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 18. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, American Civil Liberties Union 
v. Geithner (No. 1:10-cv-01303) (D.D.C., Aug. 3, 2010). The ACLU first filed for injunctive 
relief challenging the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC)’s regulation which made 
providing “legal services” to those designated as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists” 
(“SDGTs”) an inchoate crime under the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations.   See Al-
Aulaqi Executive Order, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233. 
 19. See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 5 (citing Proposed Preliminary 
Injunction at 2, Al Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-01469)). 
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deprived of life without due process of law.”20  The complaint also alleged 
that “the United States’ refusal to disclose the criteria by which it selects 
U.S. citizens like plaintiff’s son for targeted killing independently violates 
the notice requirement of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.”21  In 
other words, al-Aulaqi’s father was essentially asking the U.S. government 
to not kill his son without charging him with a crime or without specific 
evidence that he was about to commit a crime.   
B. The Justice Department’s Response
On September 24, 2010, the Obama Administration responded with a 
lengthy motion to dismiss.22  The motion confirmed speculation that the 
Justice Department would seek to quickly have the motion dismissed and 
avoid having the particulars of its operations against certain terrorists from 
being litigated in court; there appeared to be internal debate within the 
Administration whether to invoke the “political question doctrine” or the 
“state secrets” doctrine.23  The state secrets privilege, first articulated in 
United States v. Reynolds, essentially allows the Executive branch to 
prevent the disclosure in litigation of any “military matters which, in the 
interests of national security, should not be divulged.”24  There was some 
question as to whether the Obama Administration would invoke the state 
secrets doctrine in this case,25 especially in light of President Obama’s 
Inauguration–pledged changes in policy regarding the War on Terror.26
While the Justice Department’s response articulated several arguments as 
to why the injunction should not be granted,27 the motion did indeed invoke 
 20. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 21. Id.
 22. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 1. 
 23. Charlie Savage, U.S. Debates Response to Targeted Killing Lawsuit, N.Y.TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2010, at A10. 
 24. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). 
 25. Savage, supra note 22, at A10.  
 26. See Editorial, Shady Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A38. The New York 
Times Editorial Board noted that “[d]espite President Obama’s promises of reform in this 
area, the public still cannot reliably distinguish between legitimate and self-serving uses of 
the national security claims.”See also Michael B. Mukasey, The Obama Administration and 
the War on Terror, 33 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 953, 955-56 (2010). Mukasey, the United 
States Attorney General from 2007-2009, stated that the Obama Administration’s proposed 
sweeping changes to U.S. policy regarding the capture and prosecution of terrorists and 
“willingness to disclose the limits of how we gather intelligence adds to the risk that 
defendants will turn legal processes into a source of intelligence for themselves and into a 
forum for expressing their views.” Id. at 961. 
 27. For example, the motion asserts that “[t]his Court should not recognize the novel 
[Alien Tort Statute] cause of action plaintiff seeks to assert for the alleged ‘arbitrary killing’ 
of his son” because doing so would improperly allow injunctive relief under the ATS when, 
combined with the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), only monetary damages 
are allowed.  See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 40-41.
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the state secrets privilege to bar further litigation of the complaint.28  The 
motion presented several justifications to be considered before the state 
secrets doctrine; notably, the political question doctrine.29  The political 
question doctrine excludes political and policy questions from judicial 
review when said questions are the exclusive purview of the executive or 
the legislative branches.30 The Administration argued that enforcement of 
such an injunction would insert the Judiciary into an area of decision–
making where the courts are particularly ill–equipped to venture, i.e., in 
assessing whether a particular threat to national security is imminent and 
whether reasonable alternatives for the defense of the Nation exist to the use 
of lethal military force.  Courts have neither the authority nor expertise to 
assume these tasks.31
In response to Nasser al-Aulaqi’s argument that use of lethal force 
against Anwar outside of the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan should be 
barred because it is not a part of any “armed conflict,” the Administration 
asserted that “the very determination of whether and in what circumstances 
the United States’ armed conflict with al-Qaeda might extend beyond the 
borders of Iraq and Afghanistan is itself a non-justicable political 
question.”32  The thrust of the argument was essentially that the injunction 
would force the courts to handcuff the Administration’s military operations 
against al-Qaeda and terrorists abroad by articulating a standard for “what 
actions the President and U.S. forces may take against an operational 
leader” of al-Qaeda.33
The Administration’s last main argument against Nasser al-Aulaqi’s 
proposed injunctive relief invoked the state secrets privilege; in doing so, 
the Justice Department noted that it determined the privilege should be 
invoked after complying with the Attorney General’s detailed policy that 
the privilege only be invoked when absolutely necessary.34  Specifically, the 
Administration asserted that the injunction sought by al-Aulaqi would 
require the disclosure of highly sensitive military and intelligence 
 28. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 43 (“[I]nformation protected by the military 
and state secrets privilege and related statutory protections [are] necessary to litigate 
plaintiff’s claims . . . and the case therefore cannot proceed without significant harm to the 
national security of the United States.”).
 29. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 19. 
 30. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
 31. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 19-20 (citing Aktepe v. United States, 105 
F.3d 1400, 1402-04 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[f]oreign policy and military affairs figure prominently 
among the areas in which the political question doctrine has been implicated”)). 
 32. Id. at 22. 
 33. Id. at 23. 
 34. Id. at 43.The Attorney General’s policy noted that the Justice Department would 
require independent submissions from the pertinent government agencies involved with 
invocation to determined the exact nature of the information, the possible significant harm, 
and the reason why release of the information would cause such a harm.  Id. at 44. 
2011] The Curious Case of Anwar al–Aulaqi 729
operations and activities abroad.35  The motion attached as exhibits public 
declarations by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Director of National 
Intelligence James R. Clapper and Central Intelligence Agency Director 
Leon E. Panetta each formally asserting the privilege.36
The motion concludes by noting that without the facts excluded by the 
state secrets privilege, al-Aulaqi’s case could only rely upon the New York 
Times and other media reports about the alleged targeting which “conflict 
with each other and vary from allegations in the complaint . . . [a]nd, of 
course, these media reports are devoid of any substantive discussion of the 
imminence of a threat . . . or any operational details for implementing 
alleged lethal force or carrying out the alleged targeting of al-Aulaqi.”37
Thus, without any factual basis, the motion for injunctive relief would be 
essentially stopped in its tracks.38
C. The ACLU’s Arguments
On October 8, 2010, the ACLU and CCR responded to the Justice 
Department’s lengthy motion with a lengthy reply brief of their own.39  The 
plaintiffs’ brief summarized the government’s argument as being “that the 
executive, which must obtain judicial approval to monitor a U.S. citizen’s 
communications or search his briefcase, may execute that citizen without 
any obligation to justify its actions to a court or to the public.”40  The brief 
pointedly noted that the Administration’s assertion that al-Aulaqi can avoid 
harm by turning himself in confirms that he is indeed at risk of suffering 
said harm (death by predator drone strike).41  Further, the plaintiffs’ brief 
noted that the argument about avoiding the harm through surrender also 
confirmed the illegality of the government’s action because “the 
government lacks authority to summarily execute fugitives from the law.  
The government cannot kill its own citizens simply because they refuse to 
present themselves to the proper authorities.”42
 35. Id. at 44-45. 
 36. See Clapper Declaration, supra note 5;Unclassified Declaration in Support of 
Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege by Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, Al-
Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-01469);Unclassified 
Declaration in Support of Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege by Leon E. Panetta, 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2010) (No. 10-cv-01469). 
 37. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 57-58.  
 38. With the proper invocation of the state secrets doctrine, al-Aulaqi and the 
ACLU’s chances of success were rather slim.   
 39. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction and In Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-01469) [hereinafter Reply Memorandum]. 
 40. Id. at 1. 
 41. Id. at 3. 
 42. Id. at 9.The Plaintiff’s brief also points out that, as of the time of filing, Al-
Aulaqi had not been charged with a crime by either the United States or Yemen, but on 
730 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:3
On the issue of relief, the plaintiffs’ brief argued that the claim is not 
speculative and is indeed tied to a particular fact situation: the anticipated 
use of “lethal force against a specific American whom the government has 
labeled an enemy of the state.”43  The plaintiffs’ brief also asserted that the 
relief sought by the injunction is not necessarily an abstract judicial 
command, but a declaration of what law applies to this particular situation.44
Specifically, the plaintiffs pointed out that the administration has couched 
this situation in terms of the law of armed conflict, but was asking the court 
to declare what law applies and order the compliance with the specific legal 
constraints that apply to “the government’s avowed intent to use lethal force 
against a citizen outside armed conflict.”45  The plaintiffs admitted that, due 
to the sensitive nature of military operations abroad, the injunction may 
only be enforceable in an after–the–fact contempt motion or judgment for 
damages, as opposed to judicial command of the military mid-operation.46
The plaintiff strongly asserted that the government is being overbroad in 
declaring that judicial review could never apply to military situations, 
noting the various Guantanamo detention cases as recent and prominent 
examples of judicial review of military conduct; specifically, that the D.C. 
Circuit has become “accustomed to evaluating information that is sensitive 
for reasons of foreign policy, military strategy, and national security.”47
The plaintiffs also attacked the government’s reliance on Gilligan, the Kent 
State University National Guard case, as standing for the proposition that 
the courts will not second guess or interfere with complex military 
procedures and training.48  The plaintiff also noted that the Gilligan court 
encouraged damages or injunctive relief for specific unlawful actions, as 
opposed to the broad potential violations of National Guard procedures at 
issue in Gilligan.49
The plaintiff argued that the political question doctrine does not bar these 
claims because the supposedly non-justicable questions that it is raising 
have already been litigated.50  The plaintiff argued that “the question of 
November 6, 2010, a Yemeni court ordered the “forcible arrest” of Al-Aulaqi after AQAP 
claimed responsibility for a foiled bombing plot using packages on cargo planes. Robert F. 
Worth, Yemen Judge Orders Arrest of Qaeda-linked Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010 at 
A14.   
 43. Reply Memorandum, supra note 38, at 15. 
 44. Id. at 16. 
45. Id. at 17. 
 46. Id.
 47. Id. at 18. 
 48. Id. at 19.  Specifically, the plaintiff’s brief points out that mootness was one of 
the reasons the court did not grant the requested relief in Gilligan: The injunction sought 
compliance with new procedures that had been implemented by the time the argument got to 
the court, and there was no allegation of violation of the newly installed procedures.  Id.; see 
also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).  
 49. Reply Memorandum, supra note 38, at 20. 
 50. Id. at 22. 
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whether and in what circumstances the government may target and kill an 
American citizen in Yemen is no less justicable than the question of 
whether the executive branch could indefinitely detain an American citizen 
captured in Afghanistan, a question the Supreme Court addressed in 
Hamdi.”51  The plaintiff also argued that the interpretation of the AUMF 
itself, and the determination of the appropriate force involved in its use, is 
an issue of statutory interpretation which necessarily falls to the judicial 
branch.52  The plaintiff again noted that the Administration’s reliance on 
Gilligan is faulty because Gilligan itself specifically noted that it did not 
stand for the assertion that unlawful conduct by the military could not be 
litigated in a judicial forum.53
One of the plaintiff’s strongest arguments comes from El-Shifa.54  The 
D.C. Circuit previously held in El-Shifa that there is a substantive difference 
between evaluating military action as proper or improper, versus evaluation 
of whether action taken by the military was within proper legal authority.55
The plaintiffs’ summary of the argument frames the case as a purely legal 
one: “whether the targeted killing of [a] U.S. citizen . . . outside of armed 
conflict, and in absence of an imminent threat that cannot be addressed with 
non-lethal means, violated the Constitution and international law.”56
Because the plaintiffs were asking for injunctive relief, they argued that 
they are merely seeking the injunction to lay the groundwork for a later 
judicial determination of whether the future government actions taken 
against al-Aulaqi are legal, and this would itself be a legal determination 
and not a policy judgment.57
Regarding the AUMF, the plaintiffs assert that it is inapplicable to 
AQAP.58 The plaintiff notes that “by its plain terms the AUMF . . . requires 
a nexus to the individuals and organizations responsible for the September 
11 attacks.  While al-Qaeda and the Taliban fall under this rubric, AQAP is 
a separate and distinct group that is not known to have any actual 
association with al-Qaeda, whether in terms of command structure or 
activities, and no connection to September 11.”59
In response to the invocation of the state secrets doctrine, the plaintiffs 
allege that the leak of al-Aulaqi’s placement on the “kill” list was a 
 51. Id.
 52. Id. at 23. 
 53. Id. at 28.  The plaintiff also cites Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 16 (1972) (noting  
that “[t]here is nothing in our Nation’s history or in this Court’s decided cases, including our 
holding today, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or threatened 
injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied.”).
 54. Reply Memorandum, supra note 38, at 29 (citing El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. 
U.S., 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 55. Id.
 56. Id.
 57. Id at 30.
 58. Id at 38.
 59. Id.   
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deliberate leak by the administration, and thus the most important secrets 
regarding this particular issue have already been revealed and been made 
publicly known.60  The plaintiffs assert that if the government really did not 
want the fact that al-Aulaqi was being targeted to be known that it would be 
restrained the senior intelligence officials who allegedly leaked the 
information to the New York Times and Washington Post.61
Finally, the plaintiffs close by noting that they are aware that the case 
raises broad and important questions of national security, but assert that “no 
principle can be more firmly embedded in our constitutional system than the 
centrality of the right to life, and the gravity of its deprivation at the hands 
of the government.”62
II. TERRORISM, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE POST–SEPTEMBER 11
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A.  Terrorism and “Enemy Combatants”
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress 
passed the AUMF.63  One of the difficulties presented by the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 was defining exactly who the U.S. was fighting; the AUMF 
granted the President the power to:  
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts 
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.64
The broad scope of the AUMF has raised significant questions about the 
“necessary and appropriate force” required to fight terrorists abroad.65  In 
identifying broadly the parties responsible for the attacks of September 11 
and those who aided or harbored them, it would appear that this was 
intended to allow the military to use the AUMF when it inevitably came 
 60. Reply Memorandum, supra note 38, at 45. 
 61. Id.
 62. Id. at 49. 
 63. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). 
 64. Id.
 65. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization 
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005);Tung Yin, Procedural Due 
Process to Determine “Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L.
REV. 351 (2006);Elizabeth Sepper, The Ties that Bind: How the Constitution Limits the CIA's 
Actions in the War on Terror, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805 (2006). 
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into conflict with those it later discovered harbored and aided al-Qaeda; i.e., 
the Taliban in Afghanistan.   
On September 23, 2001, President Bush issued Executive Order 13224, 
“Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who 
Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism.”66  This order 
authorized the seizing of property and prohibitions of transactions with 
anyone who posed a:  
significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of 
U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the 
United States,” as well as those who “assist in, sponsor, or provide 
financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other 
services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism.”67
The Office of Foreign Assets Control passed regulations to implement 
Executive Order 13224, which took specific actions against those identified 
by the Order as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists” (SDGTs).68  The 
regulations define terrorism as:  
an activity that: 
(a) Involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or 
infrastructure; and 
(b) Appears to be intended: 
(1) To intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(2) To influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or  
(3) To affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, kidnapping, or hostage–taking.69
These regulations include specific provisions that require applying for a 
license to provide legal aid to anyone accused of violating the statute, either 
by committing a terrorist act or aiding someone through assistance, 
sponsorship or other “financial, material, or technological support.”70
Although some applications of the Order have been held unconstitutionally 
vague, the civil and criminal liabilities for providing “material support” 
 66. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Exec. 
Order]. 
 67. Id.   
 68. 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.101-594.901 (2009). 
 69. Id. § 311. 
 70. Id. § 594.506(a); Exec. Order, supra note 65.   
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have been upheld.71  The regulations provide that material support includes 
“legal, accounting, financial, brokering, freight forwarding, transportation, 
public relations, educational, or other services to a person whose property or 
interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 594.201(a).”72  Thus, the 
regulations provide civil and criminal penalties for providing any training or 
services to potential terrorists.73
The force authorized for use against al-Qaeda following September 11 
and the advanced criminal sanctions for those SDGTs would seem to be 
meant for tandem use, as both target terrorist groups.  However, while the 
foreign asset regulations impose civil and criminal sanctions for violations 
of statutory law, “[b]ecause the [AUMF] contemplates warfare, it is 
reasonable to assume that . . . Congress intended to authorize the President 
to take at least those actions permitted by the laws of war.”74  As will be 
explored infra, the Supreme Court authorized detention of detainees and 
other acts under the AUMF as bound by the laws of war;75 however, the 
Court has also held that certain minimum due process is required even in the 
theater of war.76
B.  Due Process Abroad 
1.  9/11 and the War on Terror Due Process Abroad 
One of the first cases the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments stemming 
from the War in Afghanistan was Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.77 Yaser Esam Hamdi 
was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan, and eventually transferred to 
Guantanamo Bay once the U.S. military realized that Hamdi was a U.S. 
citizen.78  The Bush Administration declared Hamdi an “enemy combatant,”
and stated that such status justified “holding him in the United States 
indefinitely—without formal charges or proceedings—unless and until it 
makes the determination that access to counsel or further process is 
warranted.”79  Hamdi, through his father,80 eventually challenged his 
“enemy combatant” status all the way to the Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari on the question of “whether the Executive has the authority to 
 71. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F.Supp.2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 
2005).   
 72. 31 C.F.R. § 594.406 (2009). 
 73. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2006) (specifying that the felony criminal conviction 
could carry a maximum of a $250,000 fine per count). 
 74. Bradley, supra note 64, at 2091. 
 75. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).   
 76. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).   
 77. 542 U.S. 507. 
 78. Id. at 510. 
 79. Id. at 510-11. 
 80. Id.  Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a write of habeas corpus in the Eastern 
District of Virginia, as next friend.  Id. at 510. 
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detain citizens who qualify as ‘enemy combatants.’”81  The Court noted that 
although the Bush Administration had not provided a definition for “enemy 
combatant,” that “[t]here can be no doubt that individuals who fought 
against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an 
organization known to have supported the al-Qaeda terrorist network 
responsible for [9/11] . . . are individuals Congress sought to target in 
passing the AUMF.”82
While Hamdi’s argument hinged on whether he could be held 
indefinitely while challenging his enemy combatant status, the Court noted 
in its plurality opinion that U.S. citizens were not exempt from becoming 
enemy combatants and treating U.S. citizens as such on the battlefield was a 
necessary incident of warfare.83  In its narrow plurality holding, the Court 
held that a citizen detained as an enemy combatant was due the opportunity 
to challenge his status before a neutral decision–maker after receiving the 
government’s factual basis for detaining him.84  However, in the opinion, 
Justice O’Connor noted that “[s]triking the proper constitutional balance 
here is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing 
combat.  But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the 
values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American 
citizenship.”85
The cases and petitions that followed Hamdi have laid out some of the 
challenges involved with the due process owed to combatants abroad.  In 
Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 extended statutory 
habeas corpus jurisdiction to Guantanamo Bay.86  In Boumedine v. Bush, the 
Court held that the Military Commissions Act (MCA)87 unconstitutionally 
suspended habeas corpus by not following the mandates of the Suspension 
Clause.88 The Court noted that “[w]here a person is detained by executive 
order, rather than, say, after being tried and convicted in a court, the need 
for collateral review is most pressing . . . [i]n this context the need for 
habeas corpus is more urgent.”89  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
noted that:  
[t]he political branches, consistent with their independent obligations to 
interpret and uphold the Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate 
about how best to preserve constitutional values while protecting the 
Nation from terrorism . . . . [t]he laws and Constitution are designed to 
81. Id. at 516; Rodriguez v. Bexar Cnty.,540 U.S. 1099 (2004) (granting cert.).  
 82. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516. 
 83. Id. at 519. 
 84. Id. at 533. 
 85. Id. at 532.
 86. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004). 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). 
 88. See Boumendiene, 553 U.S.  at 770. 
 89. Id. at 783. 
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survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.  Liberty and security 
can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the 
framework of the law.90
Kennedy’s opinion built its moral authority and reasoning, among other 
things, upon the original motivations of the Framers in including the writ in 
the Constitution; specifically, Kennedy noted that the Framers were highly 
paranoid of a strong central government and saw habeas as an essential 
protection of individual liberty.91
Thus, even in the War on Terror, a framework of legal protection was 
afforded to those captured in the battlefield.  The question which remains 
unanswered is what process is due actors, such as al-Aulaqi, before they are 
captured.  As the Administration has argued, the actions authorized by the 
Executive Branch under the AUMF, to be carried out by the military 
branches abroad, may fall outside the scope of judicial review before any 
action is taken. 
2.  Applicable Due Process Framework 
The Supreme Court has a well established line of cases and legal basis 
for due process claims.92  Specifically, the Court has held that “[t]he 
requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of 
interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty 
and property. When protected interests are implicated, the right to some 
kind of prior hearing is paramount.”93  The Court recognized that enemy 
combatants, such as Hamdi, had a cognizable liberty interest and thus were 
entitled to some degree of due process.94  In determining the process owed 
to Hamdi, the Court applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge95to
determine “the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a citizen is not 
‘deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”96
The Court articulated the Mathews factors as weighing the private life, 
liberty, or property interest that faces deprivation against the government’s 
claimed interest in such a deprivation and the burden the government would 
face if such process were granted; the scale of the private interest versus the 
government interest is then balanced “through an analysis of ‘the risk of an 
 90. Id. at 798. 
 91. Id. at 742. 
 92. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that constitutional due 
process restraints apply to deprivation of property, including public benefits); Bd. Of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that no process is due without a cognizable liberty or 
property interest). 
 93. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570. 
 94. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine 
“Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351 (2006). 
 95. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 96. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (citing U.S. Const., amend. V.). 
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erroneous deprivation’ of the private interest if the process were reduced 
and the ‘probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards.’”97 The Court held that Hamdi’s freedom was a basic liberty 
right that implicated this test;98 it seems logical to conclude that the 
potential deprivation of life would trigger the same balancing test to 
determine what process is due.   
While the distinction between U.S. citizens and foreign combatants 
became an important distinction for the line of cases concerning 
Guantanamo detainees, the Court specifically recognized the “fundamental 
nature of a citizen’s right to be free from involuntary confinement by his 
own government without due process of law.”99  On the other hand, the 
Court recognized the exigencies imposed by a state of war and the 
necessary delegation of broad power to the Executive in carrying out 
military acts.100  In balancing the rights owed and the process due to Hamdi 
and U.S. citizens in the battlefield, the Court recognized the potential 
burden upon military and the government’s argument that “military officers 
who are engaged in the serious work of waging battle would be 
unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation half a world away, 
and discovery into military operations would. . . intrude on the sensitive 
secrets of national defense.”101
3.  The Political Question Doctrine 
The sensitive nature of issues of national security that are inevitably 
presented by enemy combatant and terrorist claims has brought many of 
these claims under the scope of the political question doctrine; this has the 
potential to prevent due process claims from being adjudicated on the merits 
when this issues are found to implicate the decision–making of the political 
branches.  Although the courts have recently adjudicated several legal issues 
after detention in the battlefield, as seen in Hamdi and Boumedine, the 
question of prospective relief regarding potential military action seems to 
implicate specific policy judgments that may fall outside the scope of 
judicial review.   
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court laid out the Political Question 
doctrine, which prevents the litigation of issues intended for consideration 
by the political branches and not the judiciary.102  The Court laid out a 
specific test, holding that an issue falls under the scope of a political 
question if any of the following factors are present: 
 97. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).   
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 531 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id.
 101. Id. at 531-32. 
 102. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.103
The Court has held that issues of foreign relations104 and national 
security105 can fall outside the scope of judicial review by implicating such 
factors; however, the Court has also noted that there are circumstances 
regarding military action where the judiciary has a proper role.106  In 
Gilligan, although the Court held that the specific questions presented by 
the petitioners regarding the actions taken by the National Guard were not 
justicable under the political question doctrine, the Court stated that: 
it should be clear that we neither hold nor imply that the conduct of the 
National Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not be 
accountability in a judicial forum for violations of law for specific 
unlawful conduct by military personnel, whether by way of damages or 
injunctive relief.107
Recently the D.C. Circuit has held that “[t]he political question doctrine 
bars our review of claims that, regardless of how they are styled, call into 
question the prudence of the political branches in matters of foreign policy 
or national security constitutionally committed to their discretion.”108  In El-
Shifa, the owners of a pharmaceutical factory that was destroyed in a pre-
emptive strike against Osama bin Laden and what was believed to be a plant 
producing chemical weapons brought suit against the U.S. government for 
the destruction of the property; it was discovered soon after the attack that 
the plant actually had no connection to bin Laden at all.109  In dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claim for damages stemming from the destruction of the plant, 
the court held that the political question doctrine required the dismissal of 
the claim because “[i]f the political question doctrine means anything in the 
 103. Id. at 217. 
 104. Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 105. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981). 
 106. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 107. Id. at 12. 
 108. El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 842. 
 109. Id. at 839.  Further factual development did not occur beyond the plaintiff’s 
initial claims because the case came to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals from dismissal for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.
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arena of national security and foreign relations, it means the courts cannot 
assess the merits of the President’s decision to launch an attack on a foreign 
target, and the plaintiffs ask us to do just that.”110
It is important to note, however, that the D.C. Circuit considered the 
specific question of military action against a foreign target based on a law–
of–nations claim.111  Examining this alongside Gilligan, however, the 
implication seems to be that U.S. military action against a U.S. citizen and 
its legality is not automatically outside the scope of judicial review.   
III. IS TARGETING AL-AULAQI A DUE PROCESS VIOLATION?
Before any Due Process balancing test can be applied to al-Aulaqi’s 
case, the procedural hurdles pose significant potential difficulty in reaching 
any discussion of the merits.  Arguably, the thrust of the argument that 
would justify a lack of any legal process in light of the political question 
doctrine is that the real time military decisions, such as the decision to kill 
or not to kill al-Alaqui, is a military policy judgment delegated to the 
Executive.  Further, as argued by the Administration, the exigency involved 
with an “imminent” threat arising from the military operations in Yemen 
against al-Qaeda and AQAP is specifically authorized by Congress through 
the AUMF, bringing it under the dual auspices of the political branches.  
The Obama Administration argued that in the conflict with al-Qaeda and 
terrorists:  
whether a threat is “imminent,” and whether reasonable alternatives exist 
to the use of lethal force, may depend upon a variety of factors, including 
the existence of highly sensitive U.S. intelligence information concerning 
that threat, the capabilities of the terrorist operative to carry out a 
threatened attack, what response would be sufficient to address that threat, 
possible diplomatic considerations that may bear on such responses, the 
vulnerability of potential targets the terrorists may strike, the availability 
of military and non-military options, and the risks to military and 
nonmilitary personnel in attempting application of non-lethal force.112
Essentially, the Administration argued that whether a particular terrorist 
is a “threat,” let alone an “imminent” threat, is a policy determination that 
can never be properly litigated in a court.113
The Administration also differentiated the due process claims involved 
with habeas review from those involved with military engagement, noting 
 110. Id. at 844. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 19. 
 113. Id. (citing El-Shifa, 607 F.3d at 843, the Administration noted that “[a]ddressing 
the Baker standards, the Court in El-Shifa observed that ‘whether the terrorist activity of 
foreign organizations constitute threats to the United States’ are ‘political judgments’ vested 
in the political branches.’”).
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that the due process considerations articulated in Hamdi only applied to 
persons held in detention subsequent to capture, and that no such process 
was due to enemy combatants who had yet to be captured.114  In the 
Mathews balancing test, the government argument is that the weight of 
terrorist combatants’ right to notice and hearing is clearly outweighed by the 
potential burden upon the military during real time combat operations.   
However, the ACLU and CCR made a strong case that the force behind 
the U.S.’s actions abroad, the AUMF, must have some appreciable limit; 
they cited Hamdi for the proposition that “a state of war is not a blank check 
for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”115
While the AUMF indeed authorized broad actions against al-Qaeda in the 
wake of September 11, the connection between al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, name aside, seems more attenuated than 
the clear aiding and abetting the Taliban provided bin Laden and his 
cohorts.  If anything, AQAP was likely inspired by al-Qaeda and the 
September 11 attacks, so future acts would be clearly separate acts and not 
aiding and abetting stemming from the original attack.  This can be seen 
from the AUMF itself, which goes beyond authorizing force against nations, 
but against “organizations” and “individuals,” which implies that “[i]f an 
individual had no connection to the September 11 attacks, then he is not 
covered as a “person” under the AUMF even if he subsequently decides to 
commit terrorist acts against the United States.”116  However, under the 
broad definition of “organization,” joining together for a common purpose, 
either before or after September 11, could bring a group such as AQAP 
within the realm of affiliation for purposes of the AUMF.117
Further, one of the Administration’s main justifications for the non-
justicability of this issue and the invocation of the political question doctrine 
seems to be hamstrung by two issues.  First, Gilligan and its progeny do not 
seem to limit the injunctive relief sought here.  Second, as Hamdi, Hamdan,
Boumedine and the other Guantanamo cases demonstrate, there has already 
been significant judicial review and evaluation of the force used abroad by 
the U.S. military in the War on Terror.  Because these cases arose out of the 
U.S.’s conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, the real question becomes whether 
the War on Terror and the AUMF extend beyond the scope of these wars to 
any military action taken against terrorists in the region.  If this is a mere 
extension of the same conflict, then the potential actions taken against al-
Aulaqi would seem to fall in line with the other issues the Supreme Court 
 114. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 30. 
 115. Reply Memorandum, supra note 38, at 22 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536). 
 116. Bradley, supra note 64, at 2108.  
 117. Id. Bradley and Goldsmith note that “a terrorist organization that joins al Qaeda 
in its conflict with the United States, even after September 11, can be viewed as part of the 
“organization” against which Congress authorized force . . . [this] is also consistent with 
Congress’s definitions of “terrorist organization” in other statutes, all of which conceptualize 
terrorist organizations in broad, functional terms.” Id.
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has previously addressed.  However, if these actions are separate 
enforcement or action against terrorists abroad, the AUMF and its broad 
authorization of force which would justify killing al-Aulaqi without prior 
judicial action may not necessarily apply.  In that case, there would appear 
to be a significant due process violation.   
The Administration’s invocation of the state secrets privilege makes 
sense if it has sensitive and confidential information about future terrorist 
acts al-Aulaqi may be involved in planning; otherwise it would appear that 
all of the substantive information about al-Aulaqi’s criminal terrorist 
behavior is known.  Any of the support or training he provided to 
Abdulmutallab to aid him in attempting to bomb Detroit certainly would 
qualify as “material support” under the global terrorist sanctions, so the lack 
of any collateral damage due to the attack’s failure would not prevent any 
criminal sanctions.  However, the Administration has not yet publicly 
accused al-Aulaqi of any specific crime under the statute, and has only 
placed him on the SDGT list due to his affiliation with AQAP.  Thus, the 
main implications of force justifying action against al-Aulaqi seem to come 
from the AUMF, as claimed by the Administration in its brief.   
Inevitably, the process due to al-Aulaqi would seem to necessarily weigh 
the power granted by the AUMF against the constitutional protections 
afforded U.S. citizens engaged in or planning terrorist acts abroad.  As seen 
in Hamdi, the Supreme Court recognized that U.S. citizens will ultimately 
be owed some form of due process of liberty deprivations stemming from 
such conflicts.  It would appear that the Court could similarly take into 
account the burdens and constraints upon the military that such process may 
pose, and balance the possibility of error causing deprivation of life or 
liberty in light of the government’s concerns in applying the Mathews 
balancing test to this situation.  While the government would be able to 
argue that the potential harm that could occur during military operations is 
great, it strains the imagination to think of a loss more grave than the 
erroneous loss of one’s own life.  Although the government can articulate 
import national security and policy considerations to balance their side of 
the Mathews scale, the risk of erroneous loss of life would seem to 
counterbalance it in a way that would demand some sort of due process.   
While these important concerns may not be enough to outweigh the 
potential loss of one’s own life once the question of “what process is due” 
under Mathews is reached, as the D.C. Circuit’s decision demonstrates, even 
reaching adjudication of such claims requires overcoming significant 
obstacles.   
IV. THE DECISION AND DISMISSAL
On November 8, 2010, the District Court of D.C. heard oral arguments 
from the ACLU and CCR on behalf of Yasser al-Aulaqi and the Obama 
Administration’s team from the Justice Department; foreshadowing his 
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decision, Judge John Bates asked the parties to tailor their arguments to the 
prudential issues of standing, the political question doctrine and the state 
secrets privilege.118  The arguments were lengthy, and went on for 
approximately three hours.  Judge Bates posed difficult questions to both 
sides; he asked the government how “judicial review could be required for 
electronic surveillance of a citizen overseas, permitted for the taking of 
property of a citizen overseas, yet forbidden for the killing of a citizen 
overseas;” he asked the CCR “[i]f the targeting of a pharmaceutical plant in 
Sudan is a political question, why is not the targeting of a person in 
Yemen?”119  While Judge Bates seemed sympathetic to some of the 
plaintiff’s claims, in discussing the state secrets doctrine he did not seem to 
dispute the notion that “it may simply not be possible to litigate this case 
without disclosing important secrets.”120
On December 7, 2010, Judge Bates released his opinion granting the 
government’s motion to dismiss.121 Judge Bates recognized that “[t]his is a 
unique and extraordinary case. . . . Can the Executive order the 
assassination of a U.S. citizen without first affording him any form of 
judicial process whatsoever, based on the mere assertion that he is a 
dangerous member of a terrorist organization?”  Judge Bates noted that 
although these issues are incredibly important, without proper jurisdiction 
the constitutional and statutory claims cannot be heard.   
Judge Bates held that Yasser al-Aulaqi did not qualify as having either 
next friend or third party standing to bring claims on behalf of his son.122
Ultimately, on both issues, the fact that Anwar al-Aulaqi could surrender 
himself to the U.S. and avail himself of the U.S. courts without what the 
court found to be an adequate explanation as to why such access was not 
feasible prevented the court from holding that Anwar was unable to appear 
on his own behalf.123  While Judge Bates recognized that the plaintiff may 
have a realistic fear that his son would be held in an indefinite manner 
similar to the claimants in Padilla and Hamdi, “[t]o the extent that Anwar 
Al-Aulaqi is currently incommunicado, that is the result of his own 
choice.”124  Further, because al-Aulaqi has been able to release YouTube 
videos and other statements criticizing the U.S. government since the 
commencement of this case, “there is no reason to believe that he could not 
convey a desire to sue without somehow placing his life in danger.”  
As to third–party standing, the Judge Bates noted that Yasser al-Aulaqi 
could not claim “injury in fact if his adult child is threatened with a future 




 121. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8. 
 122. Id. at 35. 
 123. Id. at 17. 
 124. Id. at 21. 
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extrajudicial killing.”125  Although Judge Bates expressed sympathy for the 
potential loss of an adult child, “a plaintiff can only establish an Article III 
injury in fact based on emotional harm if that alleged harm stems from” a 
“legally protected” or “judicially cognizable” right originating from 
common or statutory law.126 Judge Bates noted that “[t]o date . . . no court 
has held that a parent possesses a constitutionally protected liberty interest 
in maintaining a relationship with his adult child free from indirect 
government interference.”127 Because his son’s threatened extrajudicial 
killing did not rise to the level of violating an international law norm, and 
because the U.S. had not waived sovereign immunity for such a claim, 
Judge Bates also dismissed the plaintiff’s Alien Tort Statute claim.128  The 
lack of next friend or third party standing doubly hurt the plaintiff, as not 
only did a lack of a cognizable claim under the ATS bar litigation, but even 
if the threat of extrajudicial killing was a cognizable tort under the ATS, the 
lack of standing prevents the plaintiff from bringing the claim on behalf of 
his son.129
Regarding the political question doctrine, Judge Bates adopted the 
holding from El-Shifa that “national security, military matters and foreign 
relations are ‘quintessential sources of political questions.’”130  Judge Bates 
notes that the questions that would arise during litigation of this case, 
specifically questions of Anwar al-Aulaqi’s affiliation with al-Qaeda and 
AQAP, AQAP’s relationship with al-Qaeda, and whether al-Aulaqi posed a 
“concrete, specific and imminent threat” are “precisely the types of complex 
policy questions that the D.C. Circuit has historically held non-justicable 
under the political question doctrine.”131  Judge Bates specifically states that 
even the injunctive relief and after–the–fact judicial review requested by the 
plaintiff would be barred by the political question doctrine, as “any post hoc 
judicial assessment as to the propriety of the Executive’s decision to employ 
military force abroad ‘would be anathema to . . . separation of powers’ 
principles.”132
Because Judge Bates found a political question and that itself barred 
adjudication of plaintiff’s claim, he did not need to reach the invocation of 
the state secrets privilege.133  Judge Bates makes note in a footnote, 
however, that the fact that some of the details about al-Aulaqi were leaked 
 125. Id. at 24. 
 126. Id. at 25. 
 127. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
 128. Id. at 37 (“there is no basis for the assertion that the threat of a future state-
sponsored extrajudicial killing – as opposed to the commission of a past state sponsored 
extrajudicial killing – constitutes a tort in violation of the ‘law of nations.’”). 
 129. Id. at 38. 
 130. Id. at 45 (citing El-Shifa, F.3d at 841(internal citations omitted)). 
 131. Id. at 46. 
 132. Id. at 448 (citing El-Shifa, F.3d at 844). 
 133. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 53. 
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to the media did not constitute a full waiver of the weighty state secrets 
privilege, and that “[p]artial disclosure of some aspects of the relevant 
subject matter does not warrant disclosure of other information that risks 
serious harm to the national security.”134
CONCLUSION
How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides 
to target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but. . . judicial 
scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. 
citizen overseas for death? . . . . Can the Executive order the assassination 
of a U.S. citizen without first affording him any form of judicial process 
whatsoever, based on the mere assertion that he is a dangerous member of 
a terrorist organization?135
While these questions reach the core of constitutional rights to life and 
liberty, it appears that proper answers to these questions must await another 
day.   
Judge Bates ultimately recognizes that this case, or at least parts of it, 
very likely could have been litigated, and still may, because “Anwar Al–
Aulaqi could have brought suit on his own behalf, but . . . he has simply 
declined to do so.”136  Whether it be by military tribunal or the criminal 
process in the U.S. courts, if al-Aulaqi surrendered himself he would take 
the government’s ability to kill him without process of law off the table, and 
would instead face specific charges through notice and hearing.  Although 
Judge Bates’ opinion obliquely recognizes that al-Aulaqi could eventually 
end up with a claim for the violation of his constitutional rights after being 
held incommunicado like the prisoners in Hamdi and Padilla, Judge Bates 
did not see the potential years of being held indefinitely without due process 
to itself be a due process violation.  In other words, fearing deprivation of 
due process is not a substantive due process violation in its own right.     
It seems terribly ironic that the only way to get the issue of whether the 
President can unilaterally order the assassination of a U.S. citizen and 
deprive them of their life into the courts is to surrender yourself to the court 
system and (at least temporarily) surrender your liberty.  However, our life, 
liberty and property interests are protected by the due process afforded by 
the courts and guaranteed by the constitution.  If Anwar al-Aulaqi really 
wants a declaration that President Obama cannot legally assassinate him 
without criminal charges, he can avail himself to the courts for such a 
declaration.  However, it appears that his father will be unable to obtain 
judicial confirmation that the U.S. government cannot kill his terrorist son 
via targeted killing in the absence of formal criminal charges.   
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